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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 In this appeal and cross-appeal, appellant U&W 
Industrial Supply, Inc. ("U&W") contends that a judgment for 
damages of $27,790.19 entered by the District Court of the Virgin 
 
 
Islands on U&W's requirements contract claim is inadequate.  U&W 
argues that the district court erroneously held U&W had a duty to 
mitigate damages arising from appellee and cross-appellant Martin 
Marietta Alumina Properties, Inc.'s ("MMA's") breach of 
contracts, styled by the parties "blanket order contracts," under 
which U&W agreed to supply MMA's requirements of certain parts 
and supplies. 
 MMA, in its cross-appeal, argues that the district 
court should have entered judgment in its favor on U&W's breach 
of contract claims.  MMA contends that the district court erred 
in awarding partial summary judgment to U&W on the theory that 
MMA breached a duty of good faith which the law implies in all 
commercial contracts.  The district court implied a thirty day 
notice provision into the blanket order contracts because it felt 
MMA had breached this good faith duty when it failed to give U&W 
thirty days notice before canceling individual purchase orders it 
had the option of placing under its blanket order contracts with 
U&W.  The district court's holding had the effect of adding a 
second thirty day notice provision to blanket order contracts 
which had only expressly required MMA to give U&W thirty days 
notice of a change in production levels at MMA's St. Croix 
aluminum ore processing facility. 
 Because MMA's requirements did not end, and its 
production levels did not vary substantially from those the 
requirements contracts were based on, until it actually closed 
its Virgin Island plant operations in May of 1985, we conclude 
that the court erred in implying this second thirty day notice 
 
 
provision into the contracts.  Moreover, because uncontradicted 
evidence in this record establishes that the production levels on 
which U&W's obligation to maintain its own inventories was based 
never decreased before the plant closed in May of 1985, we also 
conclude that there is no disputed issue of material fact whose 
resolution in U&W's favor would permit it to prevail under 
applicable substantive law.  Therefore, we will reverse the 
district court's order entering partial judgment for U&W and its 
order denying MMA's cross-motion for summary judgment and remand 
with instructions to enter an order granting summary judgment to 
MMA. 
 
 I.  Statement of Facts 
 U&W is an industrial piping and valve supplier located 
on the island of St. Croix in the United States Virgin Islands 
("Virgin Islands").  MMA operated an aluminum processing plant on 
St. Croix until May of 1985.  From time to time, prior to 1983, 
MMA purchased large quantities of industrial piping and valves 
from U&W for use in MMA's aluminum processing operations under 
individual purchase orders.  MMA's orders constituted 90% of 
U&W's business. 
 In 1982, MMA decided to implement a blanket order 
system for the purchase of materials.  In doing so it joined an 
industry trend toward the use of blanket orders as a means of 
better competing against the Japanese.  Before adopting the 
blanket order system, MMA had maintained a six month supply of 
the materials U&W was supplying.  It wanted to reduce its 
 
 
inventory to a one week supply and rely on contractors to supply 
those items and other materials as needed.  As finally adopted, 
MMA's blanket ordering system required suppliers who signed on to 
maintain inventories adequate to meet MMA's usual production 
levels but required MMA to place only one order within ninety 
days of signing.  MMA was then free to place, or not place, 
orders as it saw fit. 
 U&W was one of the suppliers who signed on after 
responding to MMA's invitations to bid on some of the blanket 
order contracts.  U&W submitted bids for valves, instrumentation, 
gaskets, electrical supplies, fittings and piping.  On these 
items U&W's bid was the lowest and MMA awarded U&W requirements 
contracts for these items under the terms of the blanket order 
contracts.  In its invitations to bid, MMA had included an 
analysis of its inventory needs that gave part numbers and 
descriptions of the items required, its levels of use or 
consumption of each for the current and prior year and the 
maximum quantity MMA had previously kept in inventory.  These 
blanket contracts were drafted by MMA and were offered to U&W on 
a "take-it-or-leave-it basis."  Brief for Appellee at 6.  U&W 
attempted to negotiate the terms of the blanket contracts but 
MMA's purchasing manager informed U&W the agreement could not be 
modified.  U&W then accepted the blanket contracts as MMA had 
presented them. 
 The parties executed four of the five blanket contracts 
at issue on December 23, 1983 and these were designed to run from 
January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1984.  The fifth contract ran 
 
 
from July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1984.  Except for the description 
of the products required, all five contained identical terms and 
conditions.  Under each, U&W was obligated to maintain an 
inventory of each specific part adequate to supply MMA's needs at 
its current level of production.  U&W understood the agreement 
obligated it to carry a ninety day supply of each part for MMA 
until the term of that blanket contract expired or it was 
otherwise terminated by one of the parties.  Paragraph 19 of the 
blanket contracts stated: 
 19. ESTIMATED QUANTITY OF PRODUCT 
 
  Estimated quantity of PRODUCT  required 
and release activity as defined in Exhibit A, 
is based on current production levels at [] 
Tons.  [MMA] reserves the right to change 
production levels at its sole discretion.  In 
the event of any cahnges [sic] in production 
levels, [MMA] will notify vendor of either a 
reduction in PRODUCT quantities or increase 
in PRODUCT quantities to the maximum level 
set forth in Exhibit A.  Any increase beyond 
the maximum level set forth in Exhibit A will 




Joint Appendix ("Jt. App.") at 248.  Each blanket contract 
expressly obligated MMA to place only one order within the first 
90 days, but each agreement also specifically stated MMA intended 
to place follow-up orders with U&W, despite MMA's disclaimer of 
any obligation to do so.  Each blanket contract contained a 
cancellation provision: 
 18.  CANCELLATION 
 
  (a)  [MMA] may cancel this agreement 
upon thirty (30) days written notice, at its 
sole discretion, provided however, that [MMA] 
 
 
shall remain obligated to pay for any PRODUCT 
order hereunder proir [sic] to the effective 
date of any such cancellation.  [MMA] may 
cancel any individual Purchase Order or 
release placed hereunder, subject to payment 
for materials committed to the manufacture of 
PRODUCT ordered hereunder prior to the time 
of such cancellation.  No other cancellation 
charges shall apply. 
 
 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 In mid-1984 MMA sought purchasers for its St. Croix 
plant.  In order to maintain the plant as a going concern pending 
its sale, MMA wanted to cut plant operating costs but still 
maintain production at pre-existing levels.  In July of 1984, to 
help accomplish this, MMA decided to reduce all its inventories.  
Accordingly, on July 20, 1984 MMA sent U&W reduction orders 
canceling or reducing individual purchase orders it had already 
placed under the blanket contracts.  MMA informed U&W that MMA 
was reducing its inventory without changing its production levels 
but cautioned U&W against ordering certain items to replenish 
stock until MMA advised it to.  Nevertheless, U&W states it never 
received any notice of decreased requirements from MMA. 
 In response to the July 20, 1984 reduction orders and 
MMA's cautions, U&W decreased its own inventory of the items it 
had agreed to supply MMA, even though MMA's production levels 
remained the same.  Glenn Knorr, a U&W officer, testified on 
deposition: 
 A: [After receiving the reduction orders, 
U&W] did not continue to order products 
and material to reinforce [our] 
inventories.  [With respect to the 
blanket contract for piping,] I spoke 
 
 
specifically with [James Ross ("Ross"), 
head of purchasing for MMA's St. Croix 
plant] and asked him, look are we going 
to have to order a fair amount of pipe 
in order to adhere to this contract and 
he advised me verbally again that I 
should hold off on ordering any pipe 
until he advised me again.  So at that 
time we [held off]. 
 
 *  *  * 
 
 Q: . . . After June or July of 1984 [sic] 
then you stopped ordering from your 
suppliers to replenish your inventories? 
 
 A: That's correct. 
 
 
Jt. App. at 319-20. 
 On October 16, 1984 MMA's parent corporation publicly 
announced it was withdrawing from the aluminum business.  The 
announcement, as well as MMA's subsequent efforts to locate a 
buyer for its St. Croix plant, were well publicized but efforts 
to sell the plant failed.  U&W conceded it knew of MMA's attempts 
to sell the St. Croix plant as early as the spring of 1984 but 
was continually reassured by MMA that it would be "business as 
always," Jt. App. at 319, and MMA had assured U&W that if it 
could sell the plant as a going concern, U&W's contracts would 
pass to the new owner.  Also, even though U&W knew MMA's St. 
Croix plant was for sale, it believed MMA's reduction of its 
parts inventory would somehow, in the end, increase U&W's sales 
because MMA would have to rely even more heavily on U&W to make 
timely delivery of parts MMA needed. 
 
 
 When the St. Croix plant closed, U&W unsuccessfully 
attempted to dispose of its remaining supply of the parts that 
were the subject of its requirements contracts with MMA.  U&W 
also offered MMA an exchange of those parts it could not sell on 
the island for parts that could be sold there, dollar for dollar, 
but MMA refused this exchange offer.  U&W eventually sold some of 
the parts to a salvage company. 
 
 II.  Statement of Procedural History 
 On August 12, 1985 U&W filed this action against MMA.  
The complaint sought damages for breach of contract, contending 
U&W was entitled to actual, formal notice in July, 1984 of MMA's 
decreased needs so that U&W could make appropriate adjustments in 
its own inventory levels.  U&W alleged MMA had failed to give 
notice of a decrease in its production level and that this was a 
breach of the governing agreements.  Both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment on liability.  On April 24, 1987 the late 
Chief Judge David V. O'Brien granted partial summary judgment in 
favor of U&W after concluding MMA "constructively canceled" five 
of the contracts when it implemented internal inventory 
reductions in July of 1984 without advance notice to U&W and that 
this breached an implied obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing reciprocal to U&W's express contractual duty to maintain 
an inventory "adequate" to meet MMA's requirements.  The court 
held U&W was entitled to thirty days' notice of MMA's changed 
needs because MMA had an express contractual right to terminate 
the blanket contracts on thirty days' written notice.  Judge 
 
 
O'Brien granted summary judgment to MMA on the remaining 
liability issues and ordered a hearing at a later date to 
determine damages.1  He issued two additional orders on July 16, 
1987 and September 21, 1987 concerning the damages U&W would be 
permitted to prove.  Under these orders, U&W was limited to 
damages resulting from its inability to dispose of inventory 
acquired during the thirty days immediately prior to U&W's 
receipt of MMA's reduction orders.2  If U&W had thirty days 
advance notice of MMA's construction cancellation, the court 
reasoned that U&W would not have purchased any additional 
inventory during this thirty day period.  The court did not 
permit U&W to recover damages for the inventory it had on hand 
but could not return prior to the date notice was required. 
 Judge O'Brien's unfortunate death and Hurricane Hugo 
delayed final decision in the case for several years.  In 1991, 
it was assigned to a visiting judge, who had been temporarily 
assigned to the District Court for the Virgin Islands.  The 
district court held a hearing to assess damages and on 
December 27, 1991, appointed a Special Master to "prepare a 
report with findings of fact and conclusions of law and [make] a 
                     
1.  U&W has not appealed the portion of Judge O'Brien's order 
granting partial summary judgment to MMA. 
2.  Neither the parties nor the district court tell us whether 
those damages would be measured by the difference between the 
salvage price U&W received for the items it purchased during that 
thirty day period and its cost, or the prices it expected to 
receive from MMA. 
 
 
recommendation for total damages to be awarded to [U&W]."  Jt. 
App. at 10. 
 On August 20, 1992, the Special Master filed a report 
recommending U&W receive damages of $27,790.19.  The Special 
Master concluded that the "thirty day window" for damages ran 
from June 20, 1984 to July 20, 1984.  The report stated that the 
Special Master "view[ed] the scope of her review as being 
strictly limited to the holdings of the late [Judge] O'Brien" and 
therefore awarded damages only for inventory acquired during the 
thirty-day window as the inventory U&W "could have . . .  
returned"3 within the thirty day window but for lack of fair 
notice from MMA.  Jt. App. at 11-12, 17.  In setting U&W's 
damages at a net of $27,790.19, the Special Master decided U&W 
had not fully mitigated the loss that resulted from MMA's 
July 20, 1984 cancellation of the contracts because U&W should 
have immediately made greater efforts to reduce its inventory 
than it had. 
 The Special Master found that U&W did make some 
reduction in its purchases after July 20, 1984, that U&W knew it 
would not need to maintain as large an inventory as it had before 
that date and that this triggered its immediate duty to mitigate.  
Perhaps the Special Master's most pointed conclusion on 
mitigation was that U&W should have reduced its inventory to the 
                     
3.  The fact that MMA continued to purchase parts from U&W after 
July of 1984, and as late as May of 1985 when the plant closed, 
seems arguably inconsistent with the conclusion that U&W would 
have ceased purchasing inventory during the thirty days prior to 
the reduction.  See also infra note 12. 
 
 
level it would have normally maintained absent its blanket 
contracts to supply MMA's requirements.  Finally, the Special 
Master recommended that U&W receive prejudgment interest of 9% on 
the damages awarded from the date of cancellation, July 20, 1984, 
until payment. 
 Both U&W and MMA objected to the Special Master's 
Report.  On April 12, 1993 the district court adopted the Special 
Master's Report and ordered MMA to pay damages to U&W in the 
amount of $27,790.19, but only awarded interest of $3.98 per day 
to U&W from July 20, 1992 to date.4  U&W appealed this order on 
May 3, 1993.  MMA filed its cross-appeal on May 11, 1993. 
 
 III.  Statement of Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
this breach of contract action pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, 
§ 32(a) (Supp. 1993).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).  The construction of an 
unambiguous contract is a matter of law for the court and 
therefore is subject to plenary review.  Contract interpretation, 
as opposed to construction, involves mixed questions of law and 
fact.  We exercise plenary review over questions of law and 
reverse findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous.  See 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabeth, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 
F.2d 386, 401 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 289 (1993).  
                     
4.  The district court rejected the Special Master's prejudgment 
interest recommendation because she felt both sides had 
contributed to the long delay in this case. 
 
 
When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and 
decide whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and 
whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Clark v. Modern Group 
Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).  An order granting summary 
judgment will be reversed if there is sufficient evidence for a 
jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party; 
however, if the evidence is merely colorable or not significantly 
probative, an order granting summary judgment should be affirmed.  
A disputed fact is material if it would affect the outcome of the 
lawsuit.  Id. 
 
 IV.  The District Court Erred When It Rewrote 
  the Parties' Contract in Favor of U&W 
 Under the UCC as adopted by the Virgin Islands, V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 11A, § 1-203 (1987), and the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 205 (1981),5 all contracts impose an obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing in their performance and enforcement.  
See also Action Eng'r v. Martin Marietta Aluminum, 670 F.2d 456, 
460 n.8 (3d Cir. 1982).  This obligation of good faith 
                     
5.  The blanket contracts do not provide what local law is to 
govern their construction or interpretation.  The parties assume 
that the law of the Territory of the Virgin Islands applies.  
Because the contract was entered into and performed in the Virgin 
Islands by two corporations organized and existing under the laws 
of the Virgin Islands, we agree and will apply Virgin Islands 
law.  The Virgin Islands look to the Restatement for their common 
law.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 1, § 4 (1984); see also St. Surin v. 




incorporates honesty in fact as well as reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.  See V.I. Code Ann. tit. 11A, § 1-201 
(defining good faith); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 
cmt. a.  We have held that UCC section 1-203 imposes a general 
requirement of fundamental integrity in commercial transactions 
falling under the UCC.  Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 
335 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1964).  In this case, it is U&W's 
burden to prove that MMA acted in bad faith.  See Tigg Corp. v. 
Dow Corning Corp., 962 F.3d 1119, 1123 (3d Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 834 (1992); HML Corp. v. General Foods 
Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 1966);6 see also V.I. Code Ann. 
tit. 11A, § 2-306. 
 Because of the risk U&W agreed to expose itself to 
under the blanket contracts by undertaking to maintain a parts 
inventory adequate to meet MMA's usual production requirements, 
the district court decided that the duty of good faith which 
U.C.C. § 1-203 implies required it to add a notice term otherwise 
"missing" from the contract.  We disagree.  The implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in commercial contracts that section 
1-203 imposes controls the manner in which the contracting 
parties carry out the obligations they have undertaken in a 
                     
6.  In Tigg we noted two different theories by which a court may 
decide who should bear the burden of proving bad faith:  the case 
law approach, implying the burden should be placed on seller, and 
the commentator approach, favoring placing the burden on whoever 
is to benefit from a showing of bad faith.  Tigg Corp., 962 F.2d 
at 1123-24.  In HML Corp., we simply placed the burden on the 
plaintiff.  HML Corp., 365 F.2d at 83.  Here, under either 




contract; it does not give a court the power to impose additional 
obligations on one contracting party because a court concludes it 
is unfair to have the other shoulder a market risk that the 
former expressly bargained to avoid and the other expressly 
agreed to assume. 
 The district court relied on Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 
727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and KLT Industries, Inc. v. Eaton 
Corp., 505 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Mich. 1981) to reach its 
conclusion that the duty to act in good faith necessitated MMA's 
giving notice to U&W.  Tymshare was a breach of contract action 
brought by a salesman against his former employer.  The salesman 
alleged the employer breached the implied contractual duty of 
acting in good faith when it altered sales quotas in such a way 
as to deprive the plaintiff of previously earned commissions.  
Then-Judge Scalia noted that "the doctrine of good faith 
performance is a means of finding within a contract an implied 
obligation not to engage in the particular form of conduct which 
. . . constitutes 'bad faith.'"  Tymshare, 727 F.3d at 1152.  The 
court then noted that "the object of our inquiry is whether it 
was reasonably understood by the parties to this contract that 
there were at least certain purposes for which the expressly 
conferred power to adjust quotas could not be employed.  If not, 
then [the employer] is correct that no action in this regard 
could constitute 'bad faith'--or, as we would put it, there is no 
implicit contractual restriction."  Id. at 1153.  The court 
stated that the implied covenant of good faith does not 
countermand acts specifically authorized, id. (quoting VTR, Inc. 
 
 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969), nor should it be permitted to dictate an outcome contrary 
to the intent of the parties.  Id. (quoting MacDougald Constr. 
Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 188 S.E.2d 405 (Ga. 1972)).  But, as 
the court in Tymshare noted, "the trick is to tell when a 
contract has been so drawn."  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 KLT Industries provides one example of how a duty to 
notify may be included in the generalized obligation to act in 
good faith.  In that case, two parties entered into an agreement 
where the plaintiff would design and fabricate six highly 
specialized test stands to be used by the defendant in testing 
and adjusting cruise control devices.  Although the plaintiff did 
not perform on time, the defendant did not object and plaintiff 
continued on in the design and fabrication of the parts.  Then 
the defendant, without notice, canceled the contract without 
giving the plaintiff an opportunity to demonstrate it could 
complete the contract.  The court held that termination without 
notification violated the duty to act in good faith: 
  The good faith obligation imposed by the 
UCC requires reasonable notification before 
termination to avoid surprise, protect good 
faith judgment and reduce uncertainty.  Under 
the circumstances here [defendant's] conduct 
led [plaintiff] to reasonably believe it 
would have the opportunity to perform under 
the contract.  At least [plaintiff] was 
entitled to the opportunity to demonstrate to 
[defendant] it could perform under the 
contract within the time frame contemplated 





KLT Indus., 505 F. Supp. at 1079-80.  Thus, where the defendant 
permitted the plaintiff to continue a specialized contract and 
failed to object to a performance that did not strictly conform 
to the agreement, the defendant was required to give some notice 
of its intention to cancel the contract. 
 Neither of these cases stands for the proposition that 
a party invariably has a good faith obligation to notify a 
supplier before reducing, altering or canceling an agreement.  
Instead, they merely acknowledge certain circumstances in which a 
general implied obligation to act in good faith will command or 
prohibit acts not specifically delineated in the agreement.  But, 
as Tymshare recognized, the language of the agreement and 
expressed intent of the parties always guide the application of 
the implied duty of good faith. 
 Here, MMA did not act in bad faith when it reduced or 
canceled some of the individual purchase orders issued under the 
contracts.  When MMA sent U&W the individual purchase order 
reductions in July or August of 1984, it did so under section 
18(a) of the contract.  That section required no prior notice of 
such reductions but made MMA liable to pay U&W only "for 
materials committed to the manufacture of PRODUCT ordered 
hereunder prior to the time of such cancellation."  Jt. App. at 
248.7  The district court incorrectly treated MMA's decision to 
reduce its own inventory as a change in MMA's requirements.  
                     
7.  U&W does not contend that MMA owes it any money for materials 
committed at the time of these cancellations and/or reductions. 
 
 
Although MMA decided to reduce its individual purchase orders 
because it wanted to reduce its own inventory and use up stocks 
on hand, it continued to maintain normal production and 
accordingly continued to place individual purchase orders with 
U&W as necessary to meet its usual production requirements until 
it closed its plant in May 1985.  The blanket contracts were not 
canceled by MMA's actions because MMA continued to order parts 
from U&W and U&W continued to supply parts to MMA to meet MMA's 
normal production levels, in accordance with the blanket 
contracts.  See infra note 12. 
 Despite MMA's additional reliance on U&W for parts that 
resulted from MMA's decision to reduce its own inventory, MMA 
told U&W not to order certain additional parts until MMA told U&W 
it needed them and never objected to U&W's decision to reduce its 
own inventory of some of the parts it had agreed to supply to 
MMA.  Indeed, with MMA's knowledge and implicit approval, U&W 
thereafter curtailed its own orders from its suppliers and 
delayed placing them until absolutely necessary to meet MMA's 
continuing requirements.  In fact, this caused U&W's inventory of 
the parts it had agreed to supply to MMA to fall below that which 
would have been required to meet the estimated production levels 
MMA continued to maintain, thus putting U&W itself in technical 
breach of its express obligation to maintain an inventory 
adequate to meet MMA's unchanged production requirements.8  MMA 
                     
8.  This is consistent with Knorr's testimony that he understood 
"if [U&W didn't] have the quantities on hand even up to the end 




not only acquiesced in this, it told U&W not to order certain 
additional parts unless advised otherwise.9  In order to help U&W 
reduce its inventory, U&W's Knorr testified MMA also extended 
delivery times on orders for items U&W still had on its shelves. 
 MMA's previously specified production levels were the 
guide the blanket order agreement required U&W to use in deciding 
how many parts it had to keep on hand to meet its obligations 
under the blanket contracts.  Paragraph 19 of the blanket 
contract required MMA to give U&W notice of changes in its 
production level because MMA's production level was the basis for 
U&W's inventory levels.  See Jt. Ap. at 248.  Ross testified 
MMA's production levels and its commensurate needs did not change 
until shortly prior to the plant's closing on May 12, 1985, and 
there is no other evidence in the record showing that MMA 
decreased its production levels between July of 1984 and May of 
1985.10 
 Under the blanket contracts, MMA was not obligated to 
buy any product from U&W beyond placing one initial order within 
ninety days of entering into each contract.  U&W expressly agreed 
to bear the market risk of disposing of unneeded inventory it had 
                     
9.  We note, however, that the court did correctly grant summary 
judgment to MMA on the two blanket contracts under which MMA had 
advised U&W not to order additional parts. 
10.  Knorr did testify that he noticed a decrease in MMA's 
production levels during the first quarter of 1984, (App. at 317) 
but U&W does not claim any damages resulted from this reduction.  
Although U&W alleges it was harmed by a decrease in MMA's 
production levels in July of 1984, there is no evidence 
supporting U&W's allegation that MMA's production decreased 
between July 1984 and May 1985 when the plant closed. 
 
 
purchased to meet MMA's normal requirements when its contract 
with MMA was terminated.  See Jt. App. at 248. 
 This unrebutted evidence contradicts any implicit 
finding the district court may have made that MMA dealt unfairly, 
dishonestly or unreasonably with U&W.11  Thus, U&W, the moving 
party on its motion for partial summary judgment, has failed to 
produce evidence from which it could be inferred that MMA acted 
in bad faith.  See HML Corp., 365 F.2d at 83. 
 U&W took a calculated business risk when it agreed to 
supply MMA with parts as needed.  It accepted the risk that it 
would have to dispose of unused inventory if MMA canceled the 
contract or went out of business.  This risk is inherent in 
requirements contracts.  The contract did not oblige MMA to make 
any more than one order, let alone notify U&W if it would not be 
placing its usual amount of purchase orders. 
 It is indeed unfortunate that U&W was unable to return 
the parts it had on hand when MMA terminated the contract in May 
of 1985, but this is a risk it assumed when it agreed to supply 
MMA's requirements on MMA's terms.12  In a requirements contract, 
                     
11.  The district court stated that "MMA's unbridled discretion 
[to expose U&W to great risk in requiring it to keep the same 
inventory even though  MMA had decreased its own] requires a 
corresponding duty to act in good faith."  Jt. App. at 209.  
Thus, it implied a notice provision because "a good faith 
performance required advanced notice."  Id.  The court never 
expressly found that MMA acted in bad faith but that finding is 
implicit in its decision to add a second notice requirement into 
the blanket order agreements. 
12.  U&W co-owner John McCallum ("McCallum") testified he did not 
try to return any of his stock when he received the reduction 
and/or cancellation orders from MMA because he did not believe 
the contracts were terminated by MMA's actions.  He testified 
 
 
"[t]he seller assumes the risk of all good faith variations in 
the buyer's requirements, even to the extent of a determination 
to discontinue the business."  Welded Tube Co. of Am. v. Phoenix 
Steel Corp., 377 F. Supp. 74, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd in 
relevant part, 512 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1975); see also HML Corp., 
365 F.2d at 81.  MMA did not breach its contract with U&W or 
contravene its duty to act in good faith in May of 1985, when it 
closed its Virgin Islands bauxite plant, or in July of 1984, when 
it notified U&W it planned to reduce its own inventories while 
maintaining pre-existing production levels.  See Welded Tube Co., 
377 F. Supp. at 79.13 
 
 V.  Conclusion 
 The order of the district court granting partial 
summary judgment to U&W and its order denying MMA's motion for 
summary judgment will be reversed and the case will be remanded 
to it with instructions to enter judgment for MMA. 
 
(..continued) 
that had he attempted to return his stock at that time, his 
suppliers would have accepted approximately 80-85% of it in 
returns.  When U&W attempted to return parts to its suppliers 
after the plant closed in May of 1985, the suppliers refused to 
accept U&W's returns.  U&W believes they did so because they no 
longer considered U&W a good customer based on U&W's lack of 
recent orders and rumors concerning MMA's plant closing. 
13.  Because of our disposition of the case, we do not reach 
U&W's argument that the district court erred in reducing its 
damages because it had not met its duty to mitigate. 
